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We study experimentally bargaining in a multiple-tier supply chain with horizontal competition and sequen-
tial bargaining between tiers. Our treatments vary the cost differences between firms in tiers 1 and 2. We
measure how these underlying costs influence the efficiency, negotiated prices and profit distribution across
the supply chain, and the consistency of these outcomes with existing theory. We find that the structural issue
of cost differentials dominates personal characteristics in explaining outcomes, with profits in a tier generally
increasing with decreased competition in the tier and increasing with decreased competition in alternate
tiers. The Balanced Principal model of supply chain bargaining does a good job explaining our data, and
outperforms the common assumption of leader-follower negotiations. We find a significant anchoring effect
from a firm’s first bid but no effect of the sequence of those bids, no evidence of failure to close via escalation
of commitment, and mixed results for a deadline effect. We also find an interesting asymmetry between the
buy and sells sides in employed bidding strategy. The buy side makes predominantly concessionary offers
after the initial anchor, but a significant number of sell side firms engage in aggressive anti-concessionary
bidding, a strategy that is effective in that it increases prices while not compromising closure rates.
Key words : bargaining, behavioral experiments, multiechelon supply chains, efficiency and profitability
1. Introduction
In the Operations Management literature, supply chain management as a field of study evolved
from multi-echelon inventory and control theory via the recognition of the parochial interests of
each firm in the chain. That is, the coordination of the activities of multiple independent firms
to maximize total social value is not automatic, due to the private profitability interests of each.
Firms recognize that by cooperating on material and information flows they can create value for
society, but each also wishes to capture as much of that value as possible for their private use. The
mechanisms by which this tension is managed vary broadly, from detailed legal contracting to more
informal relationships. Managing this issue of social value versus private gain is central to supply
chain management research. Arshinder et al. (2008) catalog representative papers in this area, and
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2Cochon (2003) reviews coordination through choosing the appropriate inter-firm contract form.
These, and the references there, provide an overview of current perspectives and approaches.
Scholarly analyses of supply chains focus on issues of efficiency (are chain-wide profits maximized
by the choices made by the independent firms?) and distribution (how are the chain-wide profits
distributed along the chain?). The former is important from a social perspective (are resources
appropriately allocated?) and the latter is important from a firm perspective (understanding the
profitability consequences of alternative actions is necessary for decision makers). The answers to
these questions remain unclear. Indeed, in many supply chain contexts of practical importance
inter-firm negotiations can best be described as small numbers bargaining, an enduringly difficult
yet fundamentally important economic context. Yet we will not really understand supply chains and
their efficiency and distributional characteristics without understanding how inter-firm negotiations
determine which firm(s) get the contract(s) and at what prices. This paper contributes to our body
of knowledge by experimentally exploring these questions in the context of one common supply
chain structure, but for which theory is new and no behavioral evidence yet exists.
Our supply chain setting
Supply chains formed for different purposes generally differ in their structural dependencies. For
example, assembly operations in which an OEM must contract with at least one supplier for each
of several components differ from retailers who can choose which portfolio of products to stock,
and both of these differ from an OEM who contracts with a single tier 1 aggregator who in turn
contracts with tier 2 supplier(s), etc. Our experimental set-up is designed to represent one common
multi-tier supply chain context. An OEM designs a new product and wishes to bring it to market,
but does not have ownership or control over all of the resources required to make that happen.
The product is sufficiently new that the OEM is, at least temporarily, a monopolist vis-a-vis its
customers. The OEM will send out a request for quote (RFQ) to multiple tier 1 suppliers. The
tier 1 suppliers turn around and negotiate with their (tier 2) suppliers to get a better idea of their
possible supply costs. The tier 1 - tier 2 negotiations end with an understanding of what they will
do if they get the business from the OEM. Once their supply costs are known, the tier 1 firms
respond to the OEM’s RFQ, and then potentially further OEM - tier 1 negotiations ensue. The
chain forms when the OEM selects a tier 1 supplier to do business with at an agreed upon price,
and the tier 1 supplier selects a tier 2 supplier to do business with at their agreed upon price. We
assume that there are sufficient economies of scale in supply that a single tier 1 supplier will be
chosen by the OEM, and likewise a single tier 2 firm will be selected by the active tier 1 firm,
so that the final chain consists of three firms (and implicitly the suppliers to tier 2, as described
below).
3This situation, with an OEM selecting a single tier 1 partner from several options via an RFQ
and subsequent negotiations, and the tier 1 firms behaving similarly vis-a-vis tier 2, is common
in practice when the downstream tiers in the supply chain are performing product-specific activ-
ities. Somewhere upstream in the chain (in our experiments this is after tier 2) inputs become
more generic, competition more perfect, and firms can source inputs at something approximating
a common market competitive price. This situation, with sole-sourcing downstream and competi-
tive markets upstream, is representative of, but not limited to, the high tech, consumer products
and services, entertainment, food, furniture, large complex engineered products, and automotive
industries (see Lovejoy 2010a). The specific structure we analyze is shown in Figure 1. For ease
of interpretation we label the OEM interfacing with the public as the retailer, the tier 1 firms as
manufacturers and the tier 2 firms as suppliers, which intuitively signals the appropriate chain
relationship of supplier to manufacturer to retailer. In our experiments there are two suppliers and
two manufacturers, all with potentially different costs. c1
s
and c2
s
are the supply costs for suppliers
1 and 2, respectively (these include their costs of upstream supply and value adding cost). c1
m
and
c2
m
are the value-adding costs for (tier 1) manufacturers 1 and 2, respectively. Their supply costs
from tier 2 will be determined by negotiations. R is the revenue (net of any firm-specific value
adding cost) at which the retailer can sell the (indivisible) finished item on the market. Like the
manufacturers, the retailer’s supply cost from tier 1 will be determined by negotiations. We assume
complete information about value-adding costs, which is an abstraction in many applied settings
but not unreasonable in others. Firms go to great lengths to understand their suppliers’ costs,
because that information helps them in negotiations. In practice these efforts include reverse engi-
neering, cost modeling based on historical data, backing out component costs from competitors’
published prices for different product configurations, direct inspection of suppliers, open books
agreements, and other tactics.
Our contribution
This paper contributes to two broad categories in the supply chain and bargaining literatures, one
regarding outcomes and one regarding the process by which those outcomes are reached.
In the first category, we use our experiment to ask the following questions: (a) will the efficient
firms become active in the final contracts, (b) what will the distribution of profits be through-
out the chain, and (c) what features drive this? To the authors’ knowledge this is the first time
these questions have been addressed in a three-tier supply chain experiment. Furthermore, existing
theoretical models of supply chain bargaining (such as leader-follower models and the Balanced
4Principal solution, described below) differ in their predictions about the impact of horizontal com-
petition on the profit distribution, and we experimentally compare their predictions to outcomes.
In the second contribution category, we test several conventional wisdoms about the dynamics
of negotiations, including framing and anchoring, escalation of commitment, concessionary versus
anti-concessionary bidding, and deadline effects.
Additionally, we make a methodological contribution by studying free-form bargaining between
firms in the supply chain. Most of the existing behavioral operations experiments that study supply
chain contracting (e.g. Lim and Ho 2007, Loch and Wu 2008, Ho and Zhang 2008) use ultimatum
style bargaining - however Haruvy et al. (2014) show that supply chain coordination improves
substantially when firms can use a more flexible bargaining format. Unstructured bargaining is
both more realistic and allows greater scope for structural factors such as cost differences to impact
the resulting outcomes (e.g. a firm’s ability to make and receive multiple offers over time provides
greater opportunities to push the firms in the other tier to match offers).
Overview of our results
In the category of supply chain bargaining outcomes we find that supply chain efficiency is high
in all cost treatments, but as is usual in bargaining experiments we find a higher level of non-
closure than one would expect using purely rational economic reasoning. We find that horizontal
competition significantly influences the distribution of profits within the supply chain. Generally,
with minor exceptions, the profits that accrue to the eventually active firm in each tier will decrease
as horizontal competition in that tier increases, and increase as horizontal competition in other
tiers increases. Structural issues (e.g. cost structures) dominate individual characteristics (e.g. risk
aversion) in determining these outcomes. The Balanced Principal solution explains the data quite
well. The differences between treatments and the relative profits among tiers largely match its
predictions, however the point predictions assign too much profit to the retailer. In predicting the
outcomes of the retailer-manufacturer negotiations the Balanced Principal solution outperforms
the assumption of either retailer leadership (i.e. assuming the retailer makes a “take it or leave
it” offer) or manufacturer leadership. This lends further support to existing evidence that in small
numbers bargaining situations, the popular leader-follower frameworks for analysis underperform
relative to more bargaining-based frameworks that predict a less extreme distribution of wealth.
If, despite this, one adopts a leader-follower model in a multiple seller, single buyer supply chain,
we find the common agency format outperforms the more common designation of buyer as leader.
5In the category of bargaining dynamics, we find a significant anchoring effect in that the first bids
anchor the negotiations and the final price tends to be midway between the initial bids. However, we
find no first mover advantage, so the first bid by each party in the negotiations matters, but not the
sequence in which they make them. We see a significant deadline effect in stage 2 negotiations but
much less so in stage 1, suggesting a more complex relationship to time in multi-party bargaining
wherein some firms can be excluded. However, we find no relationship between when a deal is struck
and final prices (which we would expect to see if impatience or anxiety-to-close put negotiators at
a disadvantage). The actual sequence of bids leading to closure largely follows an intuitive path
(anchor bid followed by concessions) on the buying side but not on the selling side, where anti-
concessionary tactics are used to good effect. There also appears to be a psychological construct
at play that grants the buyer a position of power unexplained by structural characteristics.
2. Experimental Design
We developed a laboratory Supply Chain Game with free-form bargaining to study how horizontal
competition affects the efficiency and distribution of profits in a multi-tier supply chain. We studied
a 2× 2× 1 supply chain, consisting of two suppliers, two manufacturers and a retailer. Subjects
were randomly assigned to one of these three roles, which they keep throughout the experiment.
The retailer needed to establish a supply chain with one manufacturer and one supplier to bring
a single unit of a good to the retail market. If the retailer could form a supply chain he received
a fixed revenue R of $40. Each supplier and manufacturer had a cost of $5, $15 or $25 for their
value-adding activities. In order to form a supply chain the retailer needed to negotiate a transfer
price for a supply contract with a manufacturer, who in turn needed to have a supply contract
with a supplier. Based on conversations with supply chain managers, we chose to have the supply
chain game begin with the negotiations between the suppliers and manufacturers, followed by the
negotiations between the manufacturers and the retailer (See Figure 1).
2.1. Supply Chain Game Preliminaries
Subjects played a total of six periods of the Supply Chain Game. In each period subjects were
randomly and anonymously matched in groups of five, consisting of two subjects with the supplier
role, two subjects with the manufacturer role, and one subject with the retailer role. Suppliers
and manufacturers were randomly assigned to be Supplier 1 or Supplier 2 (Manufacturer 1 or
Manufacturer 2) in each period. Subjects were also informed of each player’s cost or revenue.
62.2. Supplier-Manufacturer Bargaining
The two suppliers and two manufacturers simultaneously bargained, with the manufacturers
attempting to negotiate a supply contract with a supplier. Each manufacturer negotiated separately
with each supplier until he reached an agreement with exactly one of them. Each manufacturer
could contract with just one supplier, but it was possible that a single supplier could end up
supplying both manufacturers. See the Appendix for a screenshot of the negotiation stage.
The subjects had 6 minutes in the first period (4 minutes in later periods) to negotiate.1 They could
make numerical price offers2 at any time, and could also send chat messages. Only the recipient
could see an offer or a chat message, although subjects were free to reveal that information using
the chat window if they wished. An agreement was reached if a manufacturer accepted the last
price offer from a supplier, or if a supplier accepted the last price offer from a manufacturer.
However, subjects were required to wait until 2 minutes had elapsed before accepting an offer.3
If one manufacturer struck an agreement the other manufacturer could continue negotiating with
both suppliers.
2.3. Manufacturer-Retailer Bargaining
At the conclusion of the Supplier-Manufacturer negotiations, all the subjects were shown the agreed
upon transfer prices and the new total costs for each manufacturer. The manufacturers then negoti-
ated with the retailer for 6 minutes in the first period (4 minutes in later periods). A manufacturer
could only participate in this negotiation stage if he came to an agreement with one of the suppli-
ers. As in the previous stage, subjects could make numerical price offers or send chat messages at
any time, and could accept an offer after the first two minutes. An agreement was struck when a
manufacturer accepted the last offer from the retailer, or the retailer accepted the last offer from
one of the manufacturers.
At the conclusion of the second bargaining stage all five subjects were informed whether a complete
supply chain was formed, which firms were part of the chain, and what the negotiated prices were
between the retailer and manufacturer (prm) and between the manufacturer and supplier (pms).
1We gave subjects 6 minutes in the first period to allow them to get comfortable with the computer interface and
the bargaining procedures. The 4 minute deadline in later periods was sufficient to allow most groups to negotiate
without extensive time pressures while avoiding indefinite stalling.
2 Subjects were only allowed to make or accept offers that would give them non-negative profits.
3 That is, during the first two minutes subjects can make price offers and send chat messages, but cannot accept an
offer. We included this restriction based on earlier pilot sessions where we found that subjects would race to be the
first to accept an offer rather than attempting to chat or negotiate. We felt that this time pressure was not reflective
of typical negotiations, and was not our primary focus.
7Each subject’s period payoff was calculated based on the results of the Supply Chain Game. If a
subject was not part of the final supply chain their period payoff was $0. For subjects in the supply
chain their period payoff was calculated as follows:
Retailer: piR =R− prm
Manufacturer: piM = prm− pms− cm
Supplier: piS = pms− cs
2.4. Additional Tasks
After the Supply Chain Game subjects performed two additional tasks to measure individual risk
and social preferences. The first task (based on Dohmen and Falk 2011) asked subjects to make
fifteen choices between a 50-50 lottery between $0 and $4 or a fixed payoff that varied between
choices (ranging from $0.25 to $3.75). The number of times the subject chose the fixed payoff
provides a measure of risk aversion (where choosing the sure payoff more often indicates higher
risk aversion).
The second task (based on Andreoni and Miller 2002 and Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001) involved
five unilateral allocation decisions. For each decision subjects were asked to divide 50 tokens
between themselves and another randomly selected anonymous participant. The five decisions dif-
fered in how much a token was worth to the allocator and to the recipient (ranging from $0.05 to
$0.15). Based on the allocation decisions we can identify behavior consistent with several forms of
social preferences, including selfishness, altruism, inequity aversion and social welfare maximiza-
tion.
2.5. Experimental Treatments
We examined five different between-subjects cost treatments. In all cases the most efficient firms
in a tier (i.e. Manufacturer 1 and Supplier 1) had a cost of $5. In our Base treatment we set the
second firms to have a cost of $15 - hence they were at a $10 disadvantage relative to the most
efficient firms. We then varied the level of competitiveness within a tier by increasing to $20 or
decreasing to $0 the cost difference in either the manufacturer or supplier tier. This yielded five
cost profiles, described in Table 1.
2.6. Experimental Procedures
We ran 14 sessions at the University of Michigan during 2011-2012, with a total of 210 subjects
participating4. Participants were Michigan undergraduate students. Sessions lasted approximately
1.5 hours. Subjects earned on average $19.53.
4We planned to run two to three sessions in each treatment to target approximately 40 subjects, and oversampled
the Base treatment since it provides the baseline for both the manufacturer and supplier competition manipulations.
83. Bargaining Outcomes: Existing Theory and Experimental
Literature
3.1. Efficiency
The supplier-manufacturer negotiations over supply partner and price are 2×2 (2 sellers, 2 buyers)
bargaining situations, and the subsequent manufacturer-retailer negotiations are either 2× 1 or
1× 1 situations (it is 1× 1 if one of the manufacturers does not secure a supply partner and so
cannot enter negotiations with the retailer). Theory for this type of small numbers bargaining
context is incomplete. Indeed, early economists including Edgeworth (1881), Marshall (1890) and
Bowley (1928) all viewed these contexts to be indeterminate, because there are many different
outcomes that can support (what would later be called) a Nash equilibrium. In contrast, Stigler
(1942) and Fellner (1949) argued that an efficient solution would arise that maximizes total chain
profits, but that the distribution of that profit along the chain is indeterminate. Their reasoning was
that from any inefficient position there exists an alternative efficient solution that increases total
chain profits and therefore offers a potential distribution of the additional surplus that can make
everybody better off, stimulating its adoption. Coase’s (1960) seminal arguments also support this
efficiency claim. In general, with complete information what theory exists supports the expectation
that with free-form negotiations chains with positive profit potential will form and the efficient
firms will be active in the eventual supply contracts.
3.2. Distribution
The two generic approaches to predicting wealth distributions in small numbers bargaining con-
texts are noncooperative and cooperative game theory. The noncooperative approach generally
seeks analytical tractability by specifying a detailed extensive form of the game (who talks, in
which sequence?) and adopting Nash equilibria or a variant as a solution concept. This litera-
ture is dominated by models with two tiers only, and most often with one firm per tier (bilateral
monopoly). Rather than extending simple models to multiple tiers and multiple actors per tier,
research has focused on enriching bilateral models at the player level (for example, investigating
the consequences of incomplete information or risk aversion). The authors know of no results in
the non-cooperative literature, with either complete or incomplete information, that predict the
distribution of profits in a more general supply chain with more than two tiers and more than
one player per tier. One reason is that even for the simpler models there can be many possible
equilibria with only extra-model rationales for preferring one over the other, and the nature of the
equilibria tend to be very sensitive to the particular extensive form adopted in the analysis. This
is disquieting given the less structured manner in which real negotiations appear to unfold.
9Despite this, the noncooperative approach has advantages over the cooperative alternative and
these likely explain the dominance of this approach in the extant literature. In a typical noncooper-
ative model the sets of feasible actions for two players are distinct and declared in a predetermined
sequence. The manufacturer, for example, may choose wholesale price and the retailer cannot con-
test that decision, or make a counter-offer. All the retailer can do is to choose actions in her feasible
set, order quantity for example, in response to the price declaration from the manufacturer. This
approach has some intuitive appeal, being familiar in many personal, and some industrial, purchas-
ing situations. In addition, the noncooperative approach can feature analytical tractability via a
commonly accepted approach and solution concept. For example, sequential or Stackelberg games,
with a subgame perfect solution concept, are well regarded and familiar to researchers and read-
ers alike. In contrast, cooperative games and bargaining theory have no such commonly accepted
solution concept. We refer to sequential or Stackelberg extensive form noncooperative games as
“Leader-Follower” or LF games. We note that these include the familiar principal-agent formats
that inform the large literature on auctions (c.f Krishna 2002) and mechanism design (c.f Myerson
1981), both of which have presence and relevance in the supply chain literature.
However, it is often the case in the downstream stages of supply chains that negotiations ensue
more along the lines of our experiment, with a small number of bargainers in each tier responding
to an RFQ. In that setting, it is not clear who should, or can, act as the leader or from whence
such powers would derive. To the authors’ knowledge, there is no LF theory that informs those
2× 2 negotiations5. Only recently has there been a cooperative approach that makes predictions
in this setting, as described below.
The lack of a theoretical prediction from the LF perspective for 2×2 negotiations prevents a com-
parison of our experimental results to noncooperative theory. However, the stage 2 manufacturer-
retailer negotiations (which will feature either 2× 1 for 1× 1 negotiations) fall within a class of
models that has been studied extensively from the LF perspective and which offers some predictions
about the negotiated wealth distribution. Being designated the leader confers substantial power and
influence over the outcome of a game (the leader can anticipate the follower’s reactions and craft
her offers to exploit that anticipatory understanding). For example, with complete information a
single retailer as leader facing multiple manufacturers (followers) would make a take-it-or-leave-it
offer to the most efficient manufacturer, at that manufacturer’s cost of supply, extracting all of the
possible value in the chain for herself. In general, complete information LF models with a single
5 see Pratt and Rusticini 2003 for results in a related but different setting, and the extensive literature on double
auctions, for example Smith 1962, which initially evolved to study the multilateral auction-trading mechanisms
representative of stock, bond and commodities exchanges.
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leader predict extreme distributional outcomes. In our stage 2 setting, 2× 1 or 1× 1 negotiations
with the retailer as leader will predict that the retailer takes all of the available wealth and no
manufacturer makes any profit.
There is a variant of the LF paradigm that predicts less extreme outcomes, in which multiple leaders
are allowed to make simultaneous offers to a single follower (an n×1 “common agency” problem as
in Bernheim and Whinston 1986). In that case each leader’s aggression in negotiations is checked
by competition from other leaders. With complete information the noncooperative solution is for
the most efficient leader to make a take-it-or-leave it offer to the single follower at a price equal
to the indifference point of the next most competitive leader. So, in our stage 2 setting with two
viable manufacturers as leaders facing a single retailer as follower, the noncooperative prediction
would be for the efficient manufacturer to get the contract from the retailer, and to reap profits
equal to the difference between his total costs and that of the less efficient manufacturer. If only
one manufacturer is viable (for example if only one manufacturer closes a deal with a supplier)
then the situation conforms to a standard 1× 1 model in which the manufacturer as leader will
take all of the available surplus. In stage 2 of our experiments we test the predictive power of both
forms of LF model.
The notion that one player is given the powers of a leader due to unstated, extra-model assump-
tions is not part of the general cooperative approach. Bargaining models do not, in general, grant
extraordinary power to any player in way that is not driven directly by the model parameters
reflecting the bargaining context. For example, the more attractive the outside option (that can
be embraced in the event of a breakdown of negotiations) a player has, generally the better he will
be predicted to do in negotiations.
While there are no clean predictions for our 2× 2 negotiations in the noncooperative literature,
there are some in the cooperative literature. We use the umbrella term “cooperative game theory”
broadly to refer to approaches to bargaining and negotiations that do not rely soley on assumptions
of self-interest and Nash equilibria. Rather than proposing a detailed extensive form for interactions
and attempting to predict their end-point through a detailed analysis of the give-and-take over
time, cooperative approaches tend to propose sets of conditions that a solution “should” satisfy, and
then look for outcomes that satisfy these. This allows for some intuitively compelling outcomes that
may not arise from an LF approach. For example if two equally powerful players negotiate over the
division of a fixed amount of money cooperative approaches can predict that they divide it evenly.
This outcome has intuitive appeal and experimental support (see the extensive summary of the
experimental literature in Kagel and Roth 1995), but is more difficult to get from a noncooperative
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model (although, it can be done in sequential games, see below). However, there is currently a lack
of a commonly accepted solution concept in the cooperative literature, and this may account for its
weak presence in the current supply chain literature. Published solution concepts include core, Van
Neumann and Morgenstern (VNM) sets, Shapely values, Nash bargaining and its generalizations,
and the Balanced Principal (BP) solution (see, for example, the discussion in Lovejoy 2010b). The
role of experiments will be critical in identifying which solution concept is appropriate for which
setting.
In the stage 1 (suppliers and manufacturers) negotiations, the Balanced Principal (BP) approach
is the only extant theory that is reasonable for the supply chain context and provides testable
hypotheses. The BP solution is a refinement of both the core and VNM concepts. Generalized Nash
bargaining and Shapely values are ill-suited to a context where one or more actors will be shut out
of negotiations (that is, by their structure these solution concepts grant each firm some value, no
matter how uncompetitive it is). The BP solution was derived by explicitly considering the supply
chain negotiation context (Lovejoy 2010b).
We note, in closing, that there are other approaches to negotiations between two players or tiers,
that we do not explore. These models can produce predictions that are sympathetic with bargaining
outcomes. For example, Rubinstein’s (1982) complete information alternating-offers model predicts,
with symmetry of character between the two players and an infinite horizon, that they divide the
surplus between them. Two-sided auctions tend to have multiple equilibria but some of these (with
the proper mechanism for mapping bids into outcomes) can predict a non-extreme distribution
of wealth. For example, Chatterjee and Samuelson (1987) analyze a simultaneous bid model with
incomplete information, in which the players divide the spoils based on an exogenously specified
weighted average of their bids. If either the buyer or seller is given full weight the model reduces to
an LF model with a single take-it-or-leave it offer being made by the advantaged player. When the
weights are the same, a situation that has intuitive appeal when all else is equal, the distribution
of wealth is naturally more even. Consequently, the results here are not intended to pass a final
judgment on the noncooperative versus cooperative approaches to supply chain outcomes. Rather,
we wish to better understand those outcomes and their determinants, and test the predictive power
of several distinct alternative existing theories.
3.3. Experimental Literature
There is an extensive history of experimental investigations of bargaining in both psychology (see
Rubin and Brown 1975 and Bazerman et al. 2000 for surveys) and economics (see Roth 1995 for a
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survey) dating back more than 50 years. Siegel and Fouraker (1960) provide an early and extensive
study of free-form bilateral monopoly bargaining, and study in particular the effect of informa-
tion on bargaining outcomes. They find that increasing the information subjects have about each
other’s payoffs increases both the efficiency of the outcomes as well as the frequency of prices that
yield equal payoffs. They conclude that insights from both economics and psychology contribute
to explaining their experimental outcomes. Experiments also explored structured bargaining (e.g.
Kelley et al. 1967) and multi-issue integrative bargaining (e.g. Pruitt and Lewis 1975), with con-
textualized free-form multi-issue bargaining tasks becoming a common paradigm.
Bazerman et al.(2000) identify two major themes in the social psychology of bargaining in the
1960s and 1970s: individual differences and structural variables. They conclude that the evidence
suggests that indvidual differences have a small effect on bargaining outcomes, and are generally
outweighed by situational features (Ross and Nisbett 1991, Thompson 1990, Thompson 1998).
A number of structural variables have been shown to influence bargaining outcomes including
representation of constituencies (Druckman 1967), bargaining deadlines (Pruitt and Drews 1969),
and mediation (Pruitt and Johnson 1972). However, Bazerman et al. argue that the psychology
literature moved away from these structural factors because the effects were typically consistent
with naive intuition and because these objective features of a negotiation are often beyond the
control of an individual negotiator. Instead, more recent studies of negotiations in the behavioral
literature focus on decision biases in negotiations and how individuals construe the negotiating
environment, and emphasize strategies and guidance for individual negotiators.
Prominent negotiation biases include increased concessions for positive versus negative framings
(Bazerman et al. 1985, Neale and Bazerman 1985), anchoring effects (Northcraft and Neale 1987),
overconfidence about obtaining favorable outcomes (Bazerman and Neale 1982, Neale and Bazer-
man 1985), falsely assuming that the possible surplus is fixed and therefore missing out on Pareto
improving agreements (Thompson and Hastie 1990), falsely assuming that the parties’ interests
are in conflict (Thompson and Hrebec 1996), and having a self-serving bias in judging the fairness
of outcomes (Thompson and Loewenstein 1992).
The early experimental economic literature also heavily used free-form bargaining, particularly
to test the predictions of axiomatic bargaining theories (Nydegger and Owen 1975, Roth and
Malouf 1979) and Coasean bargaining (Hoffman and Spitzer 1982), as well as examining structural
factors such as deadlines (Roth et al. 1988) and individual characteristics such as risk aversion
(Murnighan et al. 1988). Many experiments found that under free-form bargaining agreements it
was very common for outcomes to equalize payoffs (under complete information) or tokens (under
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incomplete information about payoffs), see Roth and Malouf (1979), Roth et al. (1981), and Roth
and Murnighan (1982).
With the introduction of the Ultimatum Game by Gu¨th et al. (1982) experiments examining struc-
tured sequential bargaining became popular as well, with follow up experiments by Binmore et al.
(1985), Gu¨th and Tietz (1988), and Ochs and Roth (1989) (also see Bearden (2001) and Falk et al.
(2003) for surveys of the literature on the Ultimatum Game). Gu¨th et al. found that extreme offers
were uncommon, and were frequently rejected, while fairer offers were most common and were
generally accepted. Ochs and Roth found that with two-period and three-period bargaining and
across a range of discount rates the bargaining outcomes differ substantially from the LF perfect
equilibrium outcome, with individuals often rejecting unfair offers (and frequently making disad-
vantageous counteroffers that gave the rejecter a lower absolute payoff, but a higher payoff share).
Ochs and Roth conclude that many subjects will reject insultingly low offers, and that bargainers
overall adapt their offers to account for these minimum thresholds. In a follow up paper Bolton
(1991) replicates the four key patterns of Ochs and Roth (a first mover advantage, average offers
deviating from the perfect equilibrium in the direction of equal division, frequent rejections, and
frequent disadvantageous counteroffers), and uses them to formulate a model of fairness in bargain-
ing. Similarly, experiments such as Neelin et al. (1988) that consider sequential bargaining with
more rounds of negotiation also find significant deviations from the perfect equilibrium prediction.
A number of experiments have examined multi-party bargaining, including bargaining in networks.
For example, in the psychology literature Thompson et al. (1988) and Mannix et al. (1989) examine
agendas, decision rules and power balances in a three party negotiation, while Polzer et al. (1998)
study coalition formation. Fre´chette et al. (2003, 2005a, 2005b) test experimentally multilateral
models of legislative bargaining, including the effects of selection rules and bargaining power. As
in the bilateral bargaining case outcomes were frequently more egalitarian than noncooperative
theory predicted. Charness et al. (2007) study negotiations in buyer-seller networks of different
architectures. They find that the resulting bargaining outcomes are broadly consistent with the
theoretical predictions about network structure, and that individual payoffs can change due to
the addition of a distant link. Chakraborty et al. (2010) also examine the influence of network
structure, and again find that an individual’s payoff can be influenced by distant features of the
network.
4. Hypotheses and Results
The various treatments in the experiments were designed to test theory-based hypotheses about
efficiency and the distribution of profits in a supply chain resulting from negotiations between
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tiers in the chain. Most of the hypotheses are inspired by the Balanced Principal theory, because
it is the only extant bargaining-based theory that provides whole-chain profitability predictions.
Although the first stage of negotiations is conducted with some uncertainty regarding the outcome
of the second stage of negotiations, the BP predictions (which are based on simultaneous joint
determination of all transfer prices) are tested to see if they extend into this more complex, but
realistic, context. There is no LF model that makes a clean prediction in the (stage 1) context of
two principals and two agents (see the literature review for a discussion), or for whole chain profit
profiles.
The second stage of negotiations is conducted with full information for all parties, and benefits
from both BP and LF predictions. When applying LF models, the prediction will depend on who
is designated the leader. The LF predictions will give either all surplus to the leader, or in the case
of multiple leaders (a common agency problem) the efficient firm in the leadership tier will extract
as much as the competition allows.
The BP solution to a multi-tier bargaining chain is unique if the difference in value-adding costs
between the two most efficient firms in tier k, call this ∆ck, is nonincreasing as we move upstream
in the chain (as k increases, see Lovejoy 2010b). In such solutions downstream firms for which the
∆c is so large that the second-best firm is not competitive function as a sequence of monopolists
who divide their available surplus equally, and upstream firms (where ∆c is smaller, indicating real
competition) have profits that vary with ∆c in that tier. That is, the theoretical prediction in the
complex setting of multi-tier bargaining aligns with intuition, the efficient firm in a tier will get
the contract and make profits that vary with the level of cost competition (∆c) in its tier.
We use five treatments (cases) to feature different combinations of ∆c in the manufacturer and
supplier tiers, as shown in Table 1. In all cases the revenue to the retailer (net of value-adding
costs) equals 40. This experimental structure necessarily includes cases where ∆c increases going
upstream (that is, cases where ∆c in the supply tier is greater than ∆c in the manufacturing tier,
as in treatments MDiff0 and SDiff20) which admit non-unique BP solutions. However, it is still
possible that all BP solutions share some testable attributes, as we describe below.
4.1. Supply chain formation
With complete information and positive potential profits current economic theory based on (poten-
tially constrained) self-interested behavior would predict 100% closure, as discussed above. Theories
in the industrial organizations and mechanism design literature can generate non-closure when
there is incomplete information (c.f. Vickrey 1961, D’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet 1979, Myerson
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and Satterthwaite 1983), and in fact in bilateral negotiations closure becomes less likely as the
mean beliefs of the buyer and seller get closer to each other (that is, there is less believed sur-
plus in the system). However, these theories would also predict closure in the limit as information
becomes complete. Non-closure in experimental bargaining games (such as rejection in the Ulti-
matum Game) are generally explained through non-pecuniary motivations, such as concerns for
fairness or spiteful punishment of selfish individuals.
The hypothesis that the probability of closure p = 1 is clearly rejected as soon as we have any
non-closure, which we do have here. So, not all negotiations will close even when there is com-
plete information and positive profits available. In our experiments a key contingency seems to be
asymmetry of bargaining power, where in stage 2 of the negotiations 91% of the 2x1 chains close,
but only 73% of the 1x1 chains close (this situation obtains when there is a breakdown in stage
1 negotiations, resulting in one of the manufacturers having no supplier under contract). Overall,
89% of all trials ended up with a complete supply chain (see Figure 2). So, closure is significantly
more likely than non-closure in all cases, as expected. However, the probability of closure for the
chain overall is significantly reduced when at least one of the manufacturers fails to close on a
supply contract in stage 1. This cannot be because the failed manufacturer is intransigent, because
that manufacturer is not active in the stage 2 negotiations. Rather, it appears to be the symmetry
of power in 1 × 1 stage 2 negotiations, relative to asymmetry in 2× 1 negotiations, that drives
failure to close. Further analysis would be required to confirm this. For the remainder of this paper,
all results (proportions, etc.) are computed for completed chains only.
4.2. Supply chain efficiency
By a repeat of the above arguments on closure, existing economic theory with complete information
would predict that the efficient firms will be active in the final chain. If any one of these firms is
excluded from a proposed contract, they can always make a more attractive offer to a member of
their opposite (supplier or buyer) tier. In our multi-tier setting, however, there are two different
ways to perceive efficiency. The first is ex-ante efficiency, which means that the low ex-ante (before
stage 1 negotiations) value-adding cost firms are active in the final chain. After stage one negotia-
tions, it is possible that a manufacturer with lower ex-ante costs must pay, due to poor bargaining
skills, a higher input price from his supplier and has become the higher cost firm ex-post. Ex-post
manufacturer efficiency would mean that the lowest (ex-post) cost manufacturer gets the contract
from the retailer, ex-post whole chain efficiency means that the ex-post efficient manufacturer and
supplier are both active in the final chain.
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There is one additional difference between stage 1 and stage 2 negotiations, and that is the infor-
mation available to the negotiators. Stage 1 negotiations between the manufacturers and suppliers
feature partial (incomplete) information, because they do not yet know the outcome of the stage 2
negotiations and therefore do not know the true value to a manufacturer for getting the contract.
In contrast, the stage 2 negotiations between the manufacturer(s) and retailer features complete
information.
Ex-ante efficiency
Hypothesis (Ex-ante efficiency, suppliers): The ex-ante efficient supplier will be active in completed
supply chains.
Hypothesis (Ex-ante efficiency, manufacturers): The ex-ante efficient manufacturer will be active
in completed supply chains.
Hypothesis (Ex-ante efficiency, whole-chain): Both the ex-ante efficient supplier and ex-ante efficient
manufacturer will be active in completed supply chains.
We test these hypotheses by looking for significant statistical evidence that efficiency occurs at a
rate greater than one would expect from random formation. For example to test ex-ante efficiency
among suppliers we let x denote the fraction of completed chains in which the ex ante efficient
supplier is active and test H0 : x = .5 against the alternative HA : x 6= .5.
6 For ex-ante efficiency
in the whole-chain we adopt as our null hypothesis independent random selection of firms in each
tier. In cases where these are unique (MDiff and SDiff both > 0) we would expect 1/4 of them to
be globally efficient, so letting x denote the fraction of completed chains that contain the ex-ante
efficient firms in both the supplier and manufacturer tiers we test the null hypothesis H0 : x= .25
against the alternative HA : x 6= .25.
The results by treatment and tier are shown in Figure 3. The ex ante efficient suppliers are chosen
with at least 80% probability in all treatments, and ex ante efficient manufacturers are chosen with
at least 75% probability. In all cases efficiency is significantly higher than random selection would
imply (p≤ 0.01). Whole-chain efficiency is at least 60% in all treatments, significantly higher than
with random selection (p < 0.01). There are no significant differences between treatments in the
frequency with which the efficient supplier is selected. The MDiff20 treatment has significantly
higher manufacturer efficiency than the other three treatments with different manufacturer cost
differences7 (p < 0.01), and similarly has higher joint efficiency (p< 0.01).
6We conservatively use two-sided tests throughout our analysis.
7We do not use the MDiff0 treatment in any of the statistical tests for ex ante manufacturer efficiency, since every
chain is efficient trivially. Similarly we do not test for the ex ante supplier efficiency of the SDiff0 treatment.
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Ex-post efficiency
After the stage 1 negotiations close, the total cost (input price + value adding cost) is known
for each manufacturer, giving the stage 2 manufacturers-retailer negotiations clean theoretical
predictions. In stage 2 if there is just one viable manufacturer in a chain that closes, then efficiency
is trivially assured. We exclude these trivial cases from our analysis, so all results for ex-post
efficiency are based on negotiations that result in two viable manufacturers after stage 1. Noting
that the ex-ante and ex-post efficient suppliers are the same, we test
Hypothesis (Ex-post efficiency, manufacturers): The ex-post efficient manufacturer will be active
in completed supply chains.
We test this by letting x denote the fraction of chains, among those that eventually close and for
which the stage 2 negotiations include two viable manufacturers, for which the ex post efficient
manufacturer is active, and test H0 : x= .5 against the alternative HA : x 6= .5.
Hypothesis (Ex-post efficiency, whole-chain): Both the ex-post efficient supplier and ex-post efficient
manufacturer will be active in completed supply chains. Let x denote the fraction of chains, among
those that eventually close and for which the stage 2 negotiations include two viable manufacturers,
for which both the ex post efficient supplier and manufacturer are active. We test H0 : x = .25
against HA : x 6= .25.
The results are shown in Figure 4. Both of the above null hypotheses can be rejected (p < 0.01), so
the ex-post efficient manufacturer and ex-post efficient supplier-manufacturer pairs are significantly
more likely to be chosen in all treatments. There were some differences among treatments. The
MDiff20 case was significantly more likely to result in the efficient manufacturer being chosen
relative to the other cases (p < .01 for all). This might be expected, since the efficient manufacturer
has the strongest bargaining advantage in this case. Also, in the whole-chain test MDiff20 is
modestly statistically different than MDiff0 (p= .06) and Base (p= .05). Interestingly, SDiff20 is
not as impacting as MDiff20, attesting to the importance of the M-R negotiations in the second
stage of bargaining.
In summary, we expect the ex-ante efficient firms to be active in the final supply chain, even
though the first stage negotiations feature bargaining with incomplete information. In the second
stage of negotiations, featuring complete information bargaining, we expect the more efficient
supplier-manufacturer pair to be active. There were some significant treatment effects, with a
strong manufacturer value-adding cost advantage being more highly related to efficient outcomes
than a strong supplier advantage.
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4.3. Effect of competition on profit distribution
Our experiments investigated how profits will be distributed along the supply chain, whether this
depends on the level of horizontal competition in each tier, and whether the results conform to
theory. Figure 5 plots the average profits earned by each tier of the supply chain in each treatment.
It is clear that there is substantial variation in the profit distribution between the treatments.
Retailers tend to consistently capture the largest share of the profit (earning between 40% and 60%
of the total profit). Supplier and manufacturer profits vary widely across treatments, with suppliers
earning between 10% and 40%, while manufacturers earn between 15% and 30%. Additionally,
note that even when two firms in a tier have equal costs, and are therefore highly competitive, the
winning firm still earns positive profits. Hence, it does not appear that firms are bargained down
to their reservation profit.
Comparative statics
The only extant theory that predicts the profit distribution in multi-tier supply chains with hori-
zontal competition is Lovejoy’s (2010b) Balanced Principal (BP) model. This model predicts the
outcomes shown in Table 2. A bracketed interval means that the BP solution is not unique. In those
cases, every profit profile between the endpoints is a BP solution, with the endpoints preserving
a total surplus of 30 (profits sum to 30). So, for example in MDiff0 all (supplier, manufacturer,
retailer) profit distributions λ× (0,0,30) + (1− λ)× (10,0,20) as λ ranges from 0 to 1, are BP
solutions. As described in Lovejoy (2010b), nonuniqueness results when there is a “profit bottle-
neck” in the chain, which is a stage where the horizontal value-adding cost differential (∆c) is large
relative to its downstream neighbor (for example, when ∆c in the supply tier is larger than ∆c in
the manufacturing tier). In our experiment cases were ∆c in the manufacturing tier is smaller than
that in the supplier tier (that is, MDiff0 and SDiff20) can generate non-unique BP solutions. In
contrast, when ∆c is nonincreasing going upstream in the supply chain, the BP solution is unique.
Several predicted trends in tier-specific profits as a function of horizontal competition (in the same
and alternative tiers) are robust to non-uniqueness issues. For example, retailer profits can be
expected to be decreasing (or at least non-increasing) as ∆c in the manufacturing tier increases,
because the prediction interval for MDiff0 is everywhere (except for a single point) above the
predictions for the Base and MDiff20 treatments. Table 2 shows the theory-driven predictions of
tier-specific profits as function of horizontal competition. Our specific hypotheses (we test each
claim using a Cuzicks non-parametric test for trends) and the results, are as follows.
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• Supplier profits increase with less supplier competition: supported (p< .01).
• Manufacturer profits increase with less manufacturer competition: supported (p < .01).
• Manufacturer profits do not change with less supplier competition: not supported. Manufac-
turing profits decrease significantly as horizontal competition in the supply tier decreases.
• Retailer profits decrease with less supplier competition: supported (p < .01).
• Retailer profits decrease with less manufacturer competition: supported (p < .01).
We also tested the single “no prediction” outcome from theory by testing for any significant trend
(in any direction) of supplier profits as a function of horizontal competition in the manufacturing
tier. The result was no statistically significant effect on supplier profits as a function of manufac-
turing competition (p= .4).
The predictions of the BP theory are largely supported for tier-wise profits as a function of hori-
zontal competition in the same and alternative tiers. The exception is the prediction of indifference
in the manufacturing tier as a function of competition in the supply tier. The intuition behind the
theoretical prediction is that because the efficient supplier can contract with both manufacturers
during the first stage, the two manufacturers should be able to strike the same agreement with the
supplier. Therefore, whether the supplier ought to be able to capture a large or a small profit, this
should add the same amount to the cost of both manufacturers, and therefore the cost difference
between the manufacturers should be preserved. However, our experimental outcomes differ from
this prediction. Manufacturers make more than predicted (also see Table 6 below) when supplier
competition is high in SDiff0 and Base but the same as predicted when competition is low in
SDiff20, while Retailers make less than predicted with high competition. Suppliers, by contrast,
make approximately the predicted amount in each case. Hence, the departure from theory in the
effect of supplier competition on manufacturer profits is not a function of the supplier-manufacturer
negotiations, but of the subsequent manufacturer-retailer negotiations where the retailer bargains
less aggressively than predicted. In summary, the BP predictions for the effect of tier-wise compe-
tition are generally supported, the sole exception being where a remote tier drives the results and
does so by bargaining less aggressively than anticipated.
Regression analysis
As a further test of the prediction that tier-wise profits (pi) are driven by ∆cm and ∆cs, we ran three
regressions with (supplier, manufacturer, retailer) profit as dependent variables and indicators for
manufacturer and supplier cost differences being 10 or 20:
pi =α+ β1I[∆cm=10]+ β2I[∆cm=20]+ β3I[∆cs=10]+ β4I[∆cs=20]+ β5Period+ 
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We included data from all five treatments together in the same regression. We included the period
in the regression to account for any learning or fatigue effects over time. Recall that BP theory
(see Table 2) predicts that supplier profits will increase as horizontal competition in the supplier
tier decreases (∆cs increases), with no prediction as a function of ∆cm; manufacturer profits will
increase in ∆cm and remain the same in ∆cs, and retailer profits will decrease as either ∆cm or
∆cm increase.
The regression results are shown in Table 3. The period has no significant effect, so there is no
evidence of learning or fatigue effects over time. The profits to the various tiers behaved as follows.
Supplier profit: Supplier profits increase significantly as the horizontal competition in the supplier
tier decreases (i.e. as SDiff goes from 0 to 10 and from 10 to 20). Supplier profit does not exhibit
a monotonic pattern with respect to manufacturer costs - profits decline significantly compared
to the base case if MDiff = 10, but by less and not significantly if MDiff = 20. These results are
consistent with BP predictions (Recall BP had no prediction for the influence of MDiff due to
nonuniqueness issues).
Manufacturer profits: Manufacturer profits increase significantly as manufacturer competition
declines (i.e. profits increase with MDiff), as predicted by theory. Manufacturer profits decrease
significantly when SDiff = 20 and decrease but not significantly when SDiff = 10. Recall that
theory predicts constant manufacturing tier profits in these treatments as a function of SDiff, so
theory is not challenged when SDiff = 10 but is challenged when SDiff = 20.
Retailer profits: Retailer profits decreased significantly with lower levels of horizontal competition
in either upstream tier (with MDiff=20 yielding retailer profits significantly below the base case,
but only directionally lower than MDiff=10). These outcomes are consistent with theory. Interest-
ingly, retailer profits are hurt more by decreased competition in the supply tier than by decreased
competition in the manufacturing tier (compare the effect of SDiff going from 10 to 20 to the effect
of MDiff going from 10 to 20). This highlights the importance of competitive realities in remote
tiers of a supply chain, and the importance of the stage 1, tier 1 to tier 2, negotiations to the profits
of the retailer.
4.4. BP Prediction: Whole-chain profit profile
One of the predictions of the multi-tier BP theory is the relative distribution of profits throughout
the chain, i.e. who gets the available surplus? Even in the non-unique cases there are profitability
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patterns that are robust to the range of predicted outcomes. For example, in the MDiff0 case the
predicted supplier profits are in the range [0,10], the predicted manufacturer profit equals 0, and the
predicted retailer profit is in the range [20,30]. All of these outcomes satisfy the inequalities M ≤
S <R. We test this by considering the space of strict inequalities8, in which there are six possible
events (M <S <R, S <R<M , etc.). We test the null hypothesis that the population proportion of
outcomes with the BP predicted ordering significantly exceeds what one would expect from random
outcomes. For example, let x equal the proportion of outcomes in the MDiff0 treatment with the
predicted ordering M < S < R. We test the null hypothesis H0 : x = 1/6 against the alternative
HA : x 6= 1/6. For the Base case and SDiff20 there is no strict three-tier ordering predicted by
theory, but there are predicted pairwise orderings. For example for SDiff20 BP predicts M ≤ S and
M <R. Again using a sample space of all possible 3-tier strict orderings, the two pairwise results
in SDiff20 occur simultaneously in 2 of the six ordering, so the natural null hypothesis is x= 1/3
if the outcomes were random (and likewise for the Base case outcomes). Proceeding similarly for
the remaining treatments, Table 4 shows the hypotheses and relative frequencies under random
selection. The results of these tests are shown in Table 5.
The predicted profit profile occurred in approximately two-thirds of the outcomes for three cases
(MDiff0, Base and SDiff0) - a significantly higher frequency than random ordering would predict
(p < 0.01 for each). For MDiff20 and SDiff20, however, while the predicted pattern occurred direc-
tionally more often than the null the differences were not statistically significant. For MDiff20 the
strong bargaining position of the Manufacturer seemed to disrupt negotiations in both stages; the
retailer earned more than the manufacturer (as predicted) in only 52% of chains, and the manu-
facturer earned more than the supplier in only 63% of the chains. For SDiff20 there were a large
number of cases where the supplier and manufacturer earned equal profits - as described in the
footnote above this is consistent with the BP prediction but not accounted for in the conservative
test. If we include these ties a majority of the outcomes match the BP order.
Point estimates for profitability
The BP predictions for profits to each tier, and the median experimental outcomes are shown in
Table 6. While the median outcomes are consistent with BP’s predicted relative profit profiles (as
we expect given the results of the previous section), the point predictions are significantly different
from the experimental outcomes in more than half the data9. In general, we find that
8 This is more conservative, and simplifies identifying the relevant null hypothesis. If we allow for ties where BP
predicts, and use the same null hypothesis probabilities, all our results are the same except SDiff20 now matches the
BP order 54% of the time (p=0.01).
9We use Wilcoxon rank-sum tests.
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• Retailer profits are generally lower than predicted
• Manufacturer profits are sometimes higher than predicted
• Supplier profits are sometimes higher than predicted
As described above, retailers bargained less aggressively than theory predicts in the majority of
cases, lowering their profits. This leaves more for the manufacturers and suppliers, and both do as
well or better than predicted in all cases. We will return to this point below.
In summary, the BP predictions for the profit profile (the ordering of profits) across the three tiers
of the supply chain were directionally supported in our experiments with statistical significance in
2/3 of the cases. The exceptions were MDiff20 and SDiff20 where strong bargaining positions in
those tiers seemed to have a disruptive effect. In contrast, BPs point predictions for firm profits
deviate from the data in many cases. This is due to a general feature of retailers bargaining less
aggressively than theory suggests, leaving more surplus for the manufacturers and suppliers to
divide among them. So the profile is maintained but upstream tier profits tend to be higher than
predicted.
Horizontal competition is a significant driver of the profits in any tier. The regression results suggest
that retailers are hurt by decreased competition in either upstream tier (losing between a fifth and
a third of their profit), both manufacturers and suppliers are helped by decreased competition in
their own tier (doubling their profits in the best case), suppliers show mixed effects of decreased
competition in the manufacturing tier, and manufacturers are hurt by decreased competition in
the supplier tier. All of these are consistent with theory except the last one, as discussed above.
4.5. A comparison of BP and LF supply chain models
There is no predictive LF model for our stage 1 (2× 2) negotiations. However, in stage 2 we will
have either a 2×1 or 1×1 model, for which both BP and LF solutions are available. Which model
is more predictive of outcomes?
Comparisons of mean absolute errors
LF models need to identify a leader - i.e. who is endowed with the ability to make “take it or
leave it” offers - and leadership can reside either in the manufacturing tier or the retailer tier. If
we declare the retailer the leader (case RL), the subgame perfect equilibrium is for her to declare a
price infinitesimally larger than the full cost of the (ex post) most efficient manufacturer, capturing
all of the available value for herself. If we declare the manufacturing tier as the leader (case ML),
there are two possibilities. If there is only one viable manufacturer (a 1× 1 bargaining system)
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the sole manufacturer will capture all of the value, leaving the retailer with nothing. If there are
two viable manufacturers (a 2× 1 bargaining system) we have a complete information common
agency problem (Bernstein and Whinston 1986), which has the subgame perfect solution of the (ex
post) efficient manufacturer getting the contract for a price equal to the full cost of his competitor,
thereby capturing the full ∆cm for himself. The BP solution is for the efficient manufacturer to get
the contract but get only one half of ∆cm for himself in the 2× 1 case and half the total surplus
in the 1× 1 case. Figure 6a shows the mean absolute error between these model predictions and
experimental results for manufacturer profits10.
Specifically, for each chain we computed the predicted manufacturer profit for BP and the two
LF models (RL and ML) given the outcome of the first stage negotiations. We then computed
the absolute value of the difference between the predicted and actual outcome. Finally, we took
the mean of these values over all chains (the median errors are very similar). Visually, BP is the
best model overall and RL is the worst. Rigorously, we used a pairwise, two tailed Wilcoxin signed
rank test for the equality of medians with the following results. BP is more accurate than RL in
all treatments (p < 0.01 for all); BP is statistically indistinguishable from ML in all cases except
MDiff20, when BP is unambiguously better (p < 0.01); ML is better than RL (p < 0.01), except
MDiff20 and SDiff20 for which ML and RL are indistinguishable. Hence, we find that the BP model
is equal or better than any LF model in all treatments. Interestingly, using a standard principal-
agent style of model with a retailer principal is the worst among these alternatives. If researchers
want to adhere to LF models of some sort, these results suggest the common agency format (ML)
is superior to the single-leader format (RL).
One complicating factor in comparing the models is that in between 15% and 35% of cases the ex
post inefficient manufacturer is selected, which reduces the amount of available surplus. Neither
BP nor either of the LF models predict this outcome, and hence looking at the profit levels can be
a bit misleading in that one of the models may appear to have a small error not because it correctly
predicted that a firm would receive a small portion of the full surplus, but because the whole
surplus had shrunk. To account for this we also express the models’ predictions as predicted profit
shares, and compare the differences between the predicted manufacturer shares and the observed
profit shares (shown in Figure 6b). This comparison gives a similar impression of the three models.
The RL model is again the worst (with BP being significantly better in all five cases, and ML
being better in four cases). BP is still arguably better than ML, although the comparison is closer:
10 Examining retailer profits yields the same comparison, except in cases where the inefficient manufacturer is chosen,
reducing the total surplus from what the three models predict. To account for that we also examine the manufacturer’s
profit share, shown in Figure 6b and discussed below.
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the three models are statistically indistinguishable in three cases, BP is much better than ML in
MDiff20 (average error = 14% versus 40%, p< 0.01), while ML is slightly better than BP in SDiff0
(average error = 13% versus 18%, p=0.04).
Best estimate for profits as a function of competitive context
We noted above that there is at least one situation where the manufacturer gets more than is
theoretically predicted. We can generalize our prediction for the profit to the active manufacturer
in stage 2 negotiations to α∆cm in the 2×1 case, and α(r−c1) in the 1×1 case, for some α∈ [0,1].
The BP model sets α= .5, an RL model would set α= 0 and an ML model would set α= 1. We
know from above that the BP model is, generally, the best among these options, but we can also
ask what the best α would be, based on our experimental results?
Table 7 presents the regression results for estimating the best-fitting α for our data. Columns (1)
and (2) report the estimates for fitting α to manufacturer profit levels, while columns (3) and
(4) fit manufacturer profit shares (to account for surplus changes due to selecting the inefficient
manufacturer). Columns (1) and (3) fit a single α for all five treatments, while columns (2) and (4)
fit a separate alpha for each treatment. Again, BP does quite well across these comparisons. The
best-fitting α is not statistically different from the BP prediction of 0.5 for either profit levels or
profit shares, and the point estimates are numerically very close. Similarly, the treatment-specific
estimates of α are not significantly different from the BP assumption in two of the five treatments
for both profit levels (MDiff0 and MDiff20) and profit shares (MDiff20 and SDiff20). In the other
cases we find that the best fit gives somewhat more profit to the manufacturer - as we would
expect from our previous analysis. By contrast, both the RL assumption of α = 0.0 and the ML
assumption of α=1.0 can be rejected for each profit measure, both overall and for each treatment.
In summary, BP is equal to or better than any LF model in all treatments using mean absolute
error, and is equal to or better than any LF model in four of the five cases using predicted profit
shares. If a researcher, for some reason, must use an LF model, an ML common agency choice is
in most cases better than the more common RL choice. Estimating the best α shows that over all
treatments the most predictive alpha is not statistically different from the BP choice of .5. Both
of the LF choices (α = 0 or 1) can be statistically rejected. The BP model does quite well as a
benchmark theoretical model, and at most one might want to adjust the model slightly to give
more profit to manufacturers.
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4.6. Effect of individual (subject) differences
We next examine what effect (if any) negotiator characteristics have on the distribution of profits
in a supply chain. In real supply chains these characteristics would be a combination of the values
and culture of the firm and the individual negotiators, however in our experiments these are the
same. We will refer to these as “firm” characteristics. We assess whether a firm’s risk attitudes or
social preferences change the average level of its profits. We use the lottery choice task and the
dictator allocation task (described in Section 2.4) to determine a subject’s preference type. We
identify subjects as risk averse if they chose the “safe” option more than the median amount (8 out
of 15 times). 29% of subjects were risk averse by this measure. We use the pattern of a subject’s
choices across the five allocation decisions (with different token valuations) to identify four (not
mutually exclusive) characteristics: selfishness, altruism, inequity aversion (“fairness”), and social
welfare maximization (“efficiency”). Subjects were identified as being in the (approximate) top
quartile of each preference type in the following manner:
1. Selfish: Subjects kept the full endowment in all decisions (30% of subjects)
2. Altruist: Subjects kept no more than 138 tokens in total (25% of subjects)
3. Fairness: Subjects allocations had a total absolute payoff difference of no more than $7 (25%
of subjects)
4. Efficiency: Subjects allocations created a total surplus of more than $20 (17.5% of subjects)
To test for the effect of individual characteristics on the distribution of profits in the supply chain,
we regress firm profits on the cost variables for the treatment, as well as an indicator variable Xi
for each firm i in the supply chain that denotes whether the firm has the individual characteristic.
Tables 8a-8c report the results of regressing supplier, manufacturer and retailer profits on indicator
variables for each of these five individual characteristics (with each specification including indicators
for one characteristic).
pi= α+ β1I[∆cm=10]+ β2I[∆cm=20]+ β3I[∆cs=10]+ β4I[∆cs=20]+ β5Xr+ β6Xm+ β7Xs+ β8Period+ 
While we find a few significant coefficients, there do not appear to be overall consistent patterns.
For example, while a manufacturer’s profits decrease with their own risk aversion, a retailer’s
profits are not affected by risk aversion, while a supplier’s profits increase with the retailer’s risk
aversion. Social preferences appear to matter mostly for the manufacturer-supplier relationship,
with profits decreasing when the other party is selfish and increasing when the other party is fair.
Furthermore, it is important to note both that we are testing a large number of coefficients, and
that the estimated effects are small compared to the effects of competition (which are as much as
six times as large). Hence, it appears that the effect of individual characteristics are small compared
to structural factors (consistent with the social psychology literature discussed in section 3.3).
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5. Bargaining dynamics
We have so far analyzed bargaining outcomes and which factors are important in driving those
outcomes. Our data also allows us to investigate aspects of “bargaining dynamics,” participant
behaviors during the bargaining process that affect outcomes (closure rate, the timing of closure
and/or the negotiated prices). There is a rich literature on bargaining dynamics, see Kagel and
Roth (1995), Bazerman and Neale (1992), and Bazerman and Moore (2013) and reference there.
We have already discussed (see section 4.1 above) failure to close, which has more presence in our
(and other) experiments than would be predicted by theory. Here we look at some additional issues
suggested by the literature: anchoring and the efficacy of bidding first, escalation of commitment
as a failure mode, deadline effects on the timing of offers, and the effect of impatience. We also
look at the consistency of the intuitive process of converging via alternating concessions with our
observed data, and we note some interesting behaviors that arise in our asymmetrical, multi-lateral
setting that one would not see in bilateral negotiations.
Throughout we relate bids and results to the “Zone of Possible Agreement” or ZOPA, which is
defined as the available surplus in a negotiation. We will refer to the retailer and her revenue as
R, to suppliers 1 and 2 and their costs as S1 and S2, respectively, with the cost of S1 ≤ S2, and
to manufacturers and their costs as M1 and M2 with value adding costs for M1 ≤ M2. The ZOPA
in stage 1 is the interval [S1, R - M1]. The ZOPA in stage 2 is the interval from the lower of the
two manufacturer’s supply costs (after contracting with suppliers) to the revenue R. We will refer
to a ZOPA interchangeably as being the relevant interval and/or its width, relying on context to
aid interpretation.
5.1. Some summary statistics and observations
In the first bargaining stage between suppliers and manufacturers there were on average 5.5 to
7.6 offers involving Manufacturer 1, and between 5.3 and 7.6 offers involving Manufacturer 2. In
both cases there are significant differences between treatments (Kruskal-Wallis test: p < 0.01 and
p = 0.02), with SDiff0 having the most offers in both cases. In the second stage of bargaining
between manufacturers and the retailer there were between 5.8 and 6.8 offers, with no significant
differences between treatments (Kruskal-Wallis test: p= 0.90).
In the first stage bargaining between suppliers and manufacturers (see Table 9) the buying tier
(Manufacturers) asks for the substantial majority of the available surplus (between 71% and 79%
by M1 and between 58% and 84% by M2), while the selling tier asks for less (between 21% and
51% and between 1% and 21%, respectively, for S1 and S2 negotiating with M1; between 29% to
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71% and between 0% and 29% for S1 and S2 negotiating with M2), with S1 bargaining with M2
the only case where the supplier asks for more than the manufacturer. Interestingly, in many cases
the supplier asks for approximately one third the overall surplus, consistent with an equal split
between the three tiers. These initial offers are close together; those involving Manufacturer 1 leave
between 5% and 25% of the ZOPA contested, while initial offers involving Manufacturer 2 leave
between 6% and 29% contested. These initial offers tend to anchor the negotiations (investigated
further below), with final accepted offers tending to be near the midpoint of the original offers.
The offers are generally consistent with competitive realities for the buyer and stronger seller. For
example, M1’s most aggressive offers are in SDiff0 and least aggressive in MDiff0, and S1’s most
aggressive offers are in SDiff20 and least aggressive in SDiff0. However, the weaker seller follows a
less “rational” approach, being almost as aggressive in SDiff20 as they are in SDiff0.
We see similar behaviors in the second stage bargaining between Manufacturers and the Retailer
(see Table 10). Again, the buyer’s (Retailer’s) first offers are quite aggressive, claiming between 70
and 88% of the ZOPA, with the most aggressive offers in MDiff0 and least aggressive in MDiff20.
By contrast, M1s initial offers tend towards approximately equal splits. Also, sellers are acting
rationally given competitive realities, with M1’s aggressiveness increasing with the difference in
real costs and M2’s aggressiveness decreasing in that difference.
Again the initial offers tend to anchor the negotiations, so subjects are only bargaining over between
20 and 40% of the remaining contracting space. Table 11 reports the average offers of each firm
in stage 2, as well as the average accepted offer. Both manufacturers and retailers on average
make relatively small concessions compared to their initial offers, and accepted agreements are
approximately halfway in between the initial offers of the Retailer and Manufacturer 1 (as well as
being at approximately the midpoint of the average offers). With the initially more aggressive offers
by the Retailer, the average agreement gives the Retailer between 55% and 75% of the possible
surplus.
5.2. Bargaining dynamics in the literature and in our experiments
Here we further investigate some specific bargaining dynamics issues discussed in the literature
and testable with our data.
Framing and anchoring
Final agreements tending to be midway between the initial offers can be interpreted via “framing”
and “anchoring”. Framing refers to how a negotiator perceives or interprets a deal. This goes
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beyond the actual price paid and puts that price into a more complex cognitive context. There are
a number of ways that negotiations can be framed. An individual may evaluate an offer as favorable
or unfavorable based on their prior experience of accepted offers, for example. Alternately, they
may consider structural factors such as the total available surplus along the chain, any individual
firm’s costs, or non-structural inputs like the initial bid. In this subsection we focus on that final
way to frame a negotiation, it being anchored at a specific price so that any outcome is perceived
not on its own terms, but relative to the anchor price.
Kahneman and Tversky (1981) note that the same outcome can be perceived as a gain or a loss,
depending on the reference point or anchor it is compared to, and that these effects can influence
behaviors in negotiations. So, it is often recommended in negotiations that one offer a first bid that
establishes an aggressive position, because that establishes an anchor, and then anything less (even
modestly) is perceived by the other as a favorable outcome. Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001) show
that whoever makes the first offer does better, but that this advantage is reduced if the opponent
focuses on the structural aspects of the negotiations rather than that anchor bid. There is also
an argument that in a context of incomplete information one should let the opponent bid first,
because it will reveal some information (after correcting for the anticipated aggressiveness). None
of these conventional wisdoms have been tested in our supply chain context.
Table 12 shows the results of regressing the final price paid against the initial bids of each firm
(as well as the total costs for Manufacturers 1 and 2 in the second stage negotiation). In stage 1
negotiations between M1 and the suppliers we find a significant impact of the initial offers from
both the buyer and the low cost seller on final prices, and buyer and seller initial offers are equally
influential on final price. For stage 1 negotiations between M2 and suppliers we see significant but
unequal influences of the initial offers by the manufacturer and low cost seller.
In stage 2 we again find a significant and equal impact of the initial offers from both the buyer
and the low cost seller on final prices. In the second stage negotiation there is also an effect of the
manufacturer’s total costs, however this may reflect actual bargaining power rather than anchoring,
since the coefficients change substantially when we include treatment dummies.
So, at least for the advantaged player within a tier, one’s first bid has a significant effect on outcome.
But, is it advantageous to bid first? Table 13 reports the results of regressing the agreed upon price
on an indicator for the buyer making the first offer. We find no significant effect on the final price,
and the estimated coefficient in the specification with treatment controls is of small magnitude.
Hence we find no first mover advantage or disadvantage.
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Escalation of commitment
One source of inefficiency in negotiations is a failure to close even when closure can be beneficial to
both parties and to society, and we see failure to close more frequently in experiments than would
be anticipated by theory. One contributing mechanism (see the discussion in Bazerman and Moore
2013) could be “escalation of commitment” by which we mean the (seemingly irrational) allegiance
to an initial position, once one has signaled that that position is firm. Escalation of commitment
can result in failure to close if one party refuses to move off of his or her initial, but untenable,
position. In our context, maintaining an initial position would be signaled by refusing to retreat
from an extreme initial offer, even if that meant non-closure.
To test for this, we construct for each firm a measure of their “concession” - specifically the
difference between their initial and final offer (measured as a percentage of the ZOPA). A larger
concession then indicates that a subject changed their offer by a larger amount compared to their
initial offer. We then regress an indicator for a closed agreement on the concessions of each firm,
as well as the initial offers. The results are reported in Table 14. In columns (1) and (2) we report
the results for the stage one bargaining where Manufacturer 1 is the “buyer” and the suppliers
are the “sellers,” while columns (3) and (4) report the corresponding results with Manufacturer
2 as the “buyer.” Columns (5) and (6) report the results for the second stage bargaining with
the Retailer as the buyer and the manufacturers as the sellers. Concessions generally have the
anticipated directional effects but are either not significant or marginally significant in both stage
1 and stage 2 bargaining. That is, we see no evidence of closure inefficiencies due to escalation of
commitment in our negotiations.
Convergence via concessionary offers
One intuitive impression of negotiations is of parties starting at different initial offers and then
making a sequence of concessions as the negotiations converge to an agreement. We examine how
often subjects make improving (i.e. concessionary) offers. Recall that subjects were not required
to make monotonic offers - they could choose to rescind a generous offer and replace it with a less
generous offer. However, intuitively we might expect bargainers to take turns making concessions.
We find that this is largely true for both bargaining stages for firms on the “buying” side (i.e.
Manufacturers in the first stage, and Retailers in the second stage). Almost all Manufacturer offers
in the first stage are price increases (89% of offers for Manufacturer 1, 84% for Manufacturer
2), and almost all Manufacturers offer only price increases (79% for Manufacturer 1 and 74% for
Manufacturer 2). In the second stage 75% of follow-up offers by Retailers are price increases, and
86% of Retailers who make more than one offer only make increasing price offers.
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However, for firms on the “seller” side of the negotiation we see a more nuanced story. Most of the
subjects on the selling side only make price decreasing offers (Stage 1: 77% of Supplier 1s and 78%
of Supplier 2s; Stage 2: 73% of Manufacturer 1s and 73% of Manufacturer 2s). However, only about
half of the offers are price decreases (Stage 1: 51% of Supplier 1 offers, 45% of Supplier 2 offers;
Stage 2: 52% of offers from Manufacturer 1, 50% of offers from Manufacturer 2). This is because
the non-concessionary seller firms make a substantial number of non-concessionary offers (55% and
42% for S1s and S2s in stage 1; 48% and 36% for M1s and M2s in stage 2). This is in contrast
to non-concessionary buyer firms, who still mostly make concessionary offers (25% and 21% for
M1s and M2s in stage 1; 14% for Retailers in stage 2). Hence across all four of the negotiations
about one quarter of the subjects in the seller role are using a very aggressive bargaining strategy
- making approximately as many anti-concessionary offers as concessionary offers.
Can we go further and identify the conditions under which a supplier firm uses anti-concessionary
offers? In stage 1 negotiations there is no monotonic pattern by MDiff for whether suppliers are
more likely to be anti-concessionary (trend with MDiff: p = 0.97). However, there is a significant
trend with SDiff, with suppliers being more likely to be anti-concessionary when the difference in
cost between suppliers is larger (SDiff0: 7%, Base: 26%, SDiff20: 19%, p < 0.01). In stage 2 there is
no overall pattern for whether M1 or M2 is more likely to try being anti-concessionary (p = 0.73).
There are some differences treatment by treatment, but the direction of the difference varies to an
extent that no clear claim can be made. In summary, we observe more anti-concessionary behavior
from the sell side than the buy side, and potentially when there is a significant cost disadvantage
on the sell side, but that latter claim is speculative and requires more research.
What effect do these aggressive bargaining strategies have on outcomes? Table 15 reports the
results of regressing the final price on an indicator for anti-concessionary behavior. In columns (1)
and (2) this indicator equals 1 if the sell-side firm makes at least one anti-concessionary offer, while
in columns (3) and (4) the indicator equals 1 if the buy-side firm makes an anti-concessionary offer.
Columns (1) and (3) use Stage 1 bargaining, while Columns (2) and (4) use Stage 2 bargaining. We
find that in both stages when the sell-side firm makes anti-concessionary offers this significantly
increases the final price by more than a dollar. There is no corresponding change in final price
when the (stronger) buy-side firm is anti-concessionary. We also run similar regressions testing
for an effect on closure rates. For buy-side firms we find evidence that anti-concessionary offers
reduce closure rates in first stage negotiations (β =−0.160, p < 0.01), but do not find a similar
reduction in closure rates in the second stage (β = 0.163, p= 0.16). For sell-side firms we find no
significant effect on closure in either stage, and in both cases the coefficient is very close to zero
(Stage 1: β =−0.048, p= 0.38; Stage 2: β = 0.035, p = 0.63). Hence using an aggressive strategy
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of making anti-concessionary offers is clearly beneficial for the sell-side firms: it raises the average
price without leading to more impasses.
Deadline effect
Roth, Murnighan and Shoemaker (1988) observed a high concentration of agreements in the final 30
seconds of their bargaining experiments. Overall slightly less than half of all agreements occurred
in the final 30 seconds of their experiments. The most common interpretation of this is that
negotiators will probe for advantage as long as there is time remaining, but realize more acutely
the need to close as time is expiring. Those results, however, were for bilateral bargaining where
any one party could unilaterally keep the negotiations open. In our setting firms face the possibility
of being closed out of the deal, which may inject pressure to close sooner rather than delay. Do we
see a deadline effect in our setting?
The answer is yes, with some caveats. Agreement times during both stages are bi-modal, with a
large fraction of agreements struck shortly after agreements become possible at 120 seconds, and
then (typically) another mode toward the deadline. In stage 1 the deadline effect is not strong, with
a significant difference between the last 30 seconds and previous 30 seconds in only two treatments
for agreements involving Manufacturer 1 (Base: p=0.04, SDiff20: p< 0.01) and only one treatment
for Manufacturer 2 (MDiff20: p < 0.01). Hence, anxiety-to-close may be significant in stage 1.
However, there is a substantial deadline effect in stage 2. Figure 7 shows the distribution of agree-
ment times in periods 2 to 6 (so as not to mix period lengths, see footnote 1). In each treatment
except SDiff0 at least 25% of agreements are made in the last 30 seconds, with more than 50% of
agreements closing in the last half minute in the SDiff20 treatment. This is between twice and five
times as many agreements closing than in the previous 30 seconds. A test of proportions shows a
significant increase in these four treatments (MDiff0: p= 0.02, Base: p= 0.04, MDiff20: p = 0.06,
SDiff20: p < 0.01).
Timing of closure
One feature of our bargaining context (relative to simple bilateral bargaining) is the pressure to
close a deal so as not to be left out (only one manufacturer is chosen by the retailer, and one supplier
by each manufacturer). One might anticipate that this context would generate faster closure times,
consistent with an anxiety-to-close interpretation driven by competitive realities. In addition it is
intuitive, and a feature of some analytical models (c.f. Muthoo 2002 and references there) that
impatience (as a personality trait) is disadvantageous in negotiations. If a negotiator feels that he
or she has to reach a deal sooner rather than later, whether due to personality traits or structural
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reality, she is unlikely to get the most out of the negotiations. We cannot disentangle personality
traits from structural characteristics in driving a desire for earlier closing times, but we can test
whether early closing times are related to structural characteristics and/or outcomes.
In stage 1 the earliest closing treatments for both manufacturers were MDiff0 (M1: 133 seconds,
M2: 137 seconds) and MDiff20 (M1: 131 seconds, M2: 143 seconds). The latest closing treatment
for Manufacturer 1 was the Base treatment (155 seconds), while the latest closing treatment for
Manufacturer 2 was SDiff20 (164 seconds). In stage 2 negotiations we find that in periods 2 through
6 (with four minute bargaining periods) the average closure time for the Base (175 seconds) and
SDiff20 (179 seconds) treatment is significantly later than for the MDiff0 (158 seconds) and SDiff0
(147 seconds) treatments (p = 0.07 and p = 0.01 for Base versus MDiff0 and SDiff0, p = 0.05
and p= 0.02 for SDiff20 versus MDiff0 and SDiff0). The MDiff20 treatment (159 seconds) is not
significantly different from any treatment. These do not consistently line up with a structural
interpretation. We would expect the pressure to close would be greatest when the cost differences
are smallest. However, if we regress closing times in stage 2 on the absolute difference in total cost
between the two manufacturers, while the sign is positive (as anticipated) it isn’t significant (beta
= .815, SE = .563, p = 0.170). If we include treatment dummies the effect of the cost difference
is positive and significant (beta = 1.996, SE = .812, p = 0.028). However, the treatment dummies
for closure time are still fairly large so the pressure to close isn’t fully explaining the treatment
differences. In summary, we see no consistent relationship between closing time and structural
characteristics in our experiments.
Regardless of what is driving closing time, is it related to outcomes? Table 16 reports the results
of regressing the share of the ZOPA that the buying firm earns under the agreement on the time of
the agreement, where we track separately cases where the buying firm accepts a selling firm’s offer
and where a selling firm accepts a buyer’s offer. We find no evidence for an impatience or anxiety
effect for either firm - early agreements and late agreements yield very similar outcomes. We also
find similar results using price rather than surplus share as the dependent variable. So, even if
there was some feature driving a desire for earlier closing times, they do not appear to significantly
affect outcomes.
5.3. Bargaining dynamics discussion
As is usual in bargaining experiments we find a higher level of non-closure than one would expect
using purely rational economic reasoning. We find no evidence that escalation of commitment is
the reason, but otherwise are unable with our data to identify the cause. The literature suggests
issues of fairness and/or emotional concerns not typically part of economic models.
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We find a significant anchoring effect in that the first bids anchor the negotiations and the final
price tends to be midway between the initial bids. However, we find no first mover advantage.
So, each party should consider their initial bid carefully but it does not matter in which sequence
negotiators offer their initial bids.
We see a significant deadline effect in stage 2 but much less so in stage 1 negotiations, suggesting
that with horizontal competition on both sides the desire to bargain to the end is tempered by a
countervailing desire to close. However, we find no relationship between when a deal is struck and
final prices (we would expect such a relationship if impatience or anxiety-to-close put negotiators
at a disadvantage).
The actual sequence of bids leading to closure largely follows an intuitive path on the buying side
(manufacturers in stage 1, retailer in stage 2), featuring an initial anchor bid and then concessions
(price increases for buyers) leading to eventual closure. However, 25% of sell side firms use an
aggressive strategy of making as many anti-concessionary offers as concessionary offers. Further,
this is effective because it raises the final price without reducing the closure rate. There is no
symmetrical benefit for the buying side. It may be that sell sides with significant cost differentials
engage more in anti-concessionary tactics, injecting some irrationality into a context where rational
analysis puts them at a disadvantage, but our data cannot resolve that definitively.
Another interesting buy-side versus sell-side asymmetry appears in our data. The original anchor
bids and the lack of extreme reactions to them clearly indicate that both sides perceive the buy
side to be in a stronger position than the sell side. The buy side demands a larger fraction of the
possible surplus than the sell side, and that remains true through closure. This makes sense in the
second stage were the monopolist retailer really is in a strong position. However, the justification
for this behavior is not clear in the first stage of negotiations in MDiff0 and SDiff20 where the
low cost seller should be in strong position. There appears to be a psychological construct at play
that grants the buyer a position of power unexplained by the costs alone. We cannot diagnose this
further with our data, but can suggest some possibilities. Stage 1 has the feature that no party
knows how the retailer will behave, and the buyer has to carry that burden into stage 2. It may
also be that in the more complex multilateral context of stage 1, boundedly rational negotiators
fall back to intuitive, but not necessarily relevant, framings that give the buyer power they do
not structurally deserve. Either way, negotiations in realistic supply chain contexts open up new
questions that one may not encounter in more conventional bilateral bargaining experiments.
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6. Summary and conclusions
Central questions in the study of supply chain performance are those of efficiency (is the total
profit maximized?) and distribution (who gets the potential profits in the chain, driven by what
contingencies?). In this paper we study these and other questions in the context of a three-tier, 2×
2×1 (suppliers - manufacturers - retailer) supply chain with varying levels of horizontal competition
in the manufacturer and supplier tiers. Bargaining unfolds in a manner sympathetic to many real
supply negotiations between a market-facing firm and its tier 1 suppliers, and between tier 1 and
tier 2 suppliers. Despite its sympathy with industrial reality, to the authors’ knowledge this is the
first experimental study of a supply chain with more than 2 tiers and horizontal competition within
tiers.
We find that chains form with high probability and supply chain efficiency is high across all
treatments. Profits are influenced by the degree of horizontal competition in each tier, in a manner
that is largely consistent with the Balanced Principal (BP) model of supply chain negotiated prices.
Specifically, profits in a tier will generally increase with less competition (higher ∆c) in the tier,
and decrease with less competition in other tiers. Profits to a firm can depend significantly on
competitive realities in a remote tier. Deviations from predicted outcomes tended to be in the
direction of more equitable distributions of wealth, where (the retailer primarily) does not extract
all of the value that she theoretically could demand.
There is no alternative theoretical prediction for our stage 1 negotiations known to the authors,
but stage 2 negotiations can benefit from leader-follower (LF) as well as BP predictions. The BP
model outperforms both types of LF model (with either the retailer or the manufacturing tier in
the role of leader). If we restrict attention only to LF models, declaring the manufacturing tier as
leader is best. This is interesting, given the tendency in the literature in n× 1 models to declare
the 1 player the leader. Our results suggest that the common agency approach (with the n-firm
tier as leader) is more predictive of actual outcomes. Neither, however, is as effective as the BP
model.
The BP model predicts that when there are two viable manufacturers negotiating with a single
retailer, the efficient manufacturer will get the contract and enjoy profits equal to .5∆cm. We
generalize this to assuming profits equal to α∆cm and estimate the best α from our experimental
data. Pooling all treatments, α is not significantly different from .5 (its best fitting estimate equals
.57), but in specific treatments the best α can differ significantly from .5. When this happens it is in
the direction of more equitable distributions of wealth (the retailer does not bargain as aggressively
as predicted).
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The cost profile in the chain dominates personal negotiator characteristics (such as risk aversion,
altruism, etc.) in influencing outcomes. This is consistent with current intuition that structural
characteristics dominate interpersonal differences in these settings. However, the bargaining strate-
gies that individuals use have significant impact on bargaining outcomes. The initial offers that
both the buying and selling firm make significantly affect the final price agreement. Additionally,
sell-side firms who choose to make non-concessionary offers achieve significantly higher prices.
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1: Three Tier Supply Chain Set Up 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Experimental Treatments 
Treatment  
Supplier Costs  Manufacturer Costs  Retailer 
Revenue S1  S2  M1  M2  
MDiff0 5  15  5  5  40 
Base 5 15  5 15  40  
MDiff20 5 15  5  25  40  
SDiff0 5  5  5 15  40  
SDiff20 5  25  5 15  40  
 
Figure 2:  Frequency of closure by treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Ex-ante efficiency by treatment and tier 
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Figure 4:  Ex-post efficiency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5:  Supply Chain Profit Distribution 
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Table 2:  BP profitability predictions for each treatment and tier 
Treatment Supplier profit Manufacturer profit Retailer profit 
MDiff0 [0, 10] 0 [20, 30] 
Base 5 5 20 
MDiff20 5 10 15 
Predicted trend as 
Mfg C increases 
No prediction Increases Decreases 
SDiff0 0 5 25 
Base 5 5 20 
SDiff20 [5, 15] 5 [10, 20] 
Predicted trend as  
Supp C increases 
Increases Stays the same Decreases 
 
 
 
Table 3:  Tier-level Profit Distributions 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Supplier Manuf Retailer 
    MDiff = 10 -2.649*** 3.544*** -3.393** 
 
(0.834) (0.893) (1.226) 
MDiff = 20 -0.971 5.161*** -4.579*** 
 
(0.652) (0.643) (0.973) 
SDiff = 10 2.999*** -0.612 -3.842** 
 
(0.956) (1.145) (1.513) 
SDiff = 20 6.961*** -2.764*** -6.730*** 
 
(1.086) (0.837) (1.245) 
Period -0.310* 0.00543 0.283** 
 
(0.158) (0.175) (0.108) 
Constant 6.603*** 4.601*** 19.05*** 
 
(1.180) (0.957) (1.776) 
    Observations 218 218 218 
R-squared 0.261 0.177 0.306 
M Diff 10 = 20? p = 0.03 p = 0.12 p = 0.39 
S Diff 10 = 20? p = 0.00 p = 0.02 p = 0.04 
Standard errors clustered at the session reported in 
parentheses.  Dependent variables are Supplier profit, 
Manufacturer profit, and Retailer profit.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
 
 
 
Table 4:  Whole-chain profit profiles 
Treatment 
Supplier 
Profit 
Manuf 
Profit 
Retailer 
Profit 
Profit Order 
Tested 
Relative 
frequency 
M Diff 0 [0,10] 0 [20,30] M < S < R 1/6 
Base 5 5 20 S < R & M < R 1/3 
M Diff 20 5 10 15 S < M < R 1/6 
S Diff 0 0 5 25 S < M < R 1/6 
S Diff 20 [5,15] 5 [10,20] M < S & M < R 1/3 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5:  Results of whole-chain profit profile hypothesis tests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Profitability point predictions 
 Predicted Median Experimental Outcome 
Treatment Supplier Manuf Retailer Supplier Manuf Retailer 
MDiff0 [0,10] 0 [20,30]     9.00         3.40***     17.00*** 
Base 5 5 20     5.00      7.00***     12.50*** 
MDiff20 5 10 15     8.25***    10.00      11.00*** 
SDiff0 0 5 25     2.00***      9.00***     17.00*** 
SDiff20 [5,15] 5 [10,20]     8.00      5.00     10.00 
 
*** indicates that the median outcome is significantly different from the point prediction at p < .01 (using a rank-
sum test).  All other p-values are > 0.10.    
 
 
 
 
 
Treatment BP Order % Match Order Null: Random Obs Random?
MDiff0 R > S > M 71.79% 1/6 p < 0.01
Base R > S & R > M 66.04% 1/3 p < 0.01
MDiff20 R > M > S 20.83% 1/6 p = 0.44
SDiff0 R > M > S 65.12% 1/6 p < 0.01
SDiff20 R > M & S > M 45.71% 1/3 p = 0.15
Figure 6a:  Model Error – Manufacturer Profit 
 
 
 
Figure 6b:  Model Error – Manufacturer Profit Share 
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Table 7:  Best Empirical Fit of  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Manuf Profit Manuf Profit Share 
     α 0.573*** 
 
0.566*** 
 
 
(0.0489) 
 
(0.0454) 
 α(MDiff0) 
 
0.493*** 
 
0.579*** 
  
(0.0191) 
 
(0.0107) 
α(Base) 
 
0.732*** 
 
0.746*** 
  
(0.0333) 
 
(0.0457) 
α(MDiff20) 
 
0.470*** 
 
0.467*** 
  
(0.0389) 
 
(0.0387) 
α(SDiff0) 
 
0.746*** 
 
0.702*** 
  
(0.0907) 
 
(0.0948) 
α(SDiff20) 
 
0.591*** 
 
0.610*** 
  
(0.0322) 
 
(0.0760) 
     Observations 218 218 218 218 
R-squared 0.787 0.822 0.782 0.813 
Standard errors clustered at the session reported in 
parentheses.  Dependent variables are Manufacturer profit 
in (1) and (2), and Manufacturer profit share in (3) and (4). 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
  
Table 8a: Individual Characteristics – Supplier Profit 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      Individual Traits Risk Selfish Altruist Fair Efficient 
Retailer has Trait 1.599*** 0.941 0.704 -0.0458 0.259 
 
(0.502) (1.013) (0.538) (1.051) (0.636) 
Manufacturer has Trait -0.140 -0.869** 0.499 -1.055 1.718 
 
(0.590) (0.349) (0.917) (0.922) (1.228) 
Supplier has Trait -0.423 0.0198 -0.327 -0.671 0.650 
 
(0.847) (0.453) (0.591) (0.583) (0.629) 
Treatment Controls 
     MDiff10 -3.016*** -2.443** -2.460** -2.361** -2.212** 
 
(0.777) (1.039) (0.947) (0.852) (0.904) 
MDiff20 -1.410** -1.237 -0.815 -0.584 -0.471 
 
(0.612) (0.971) (0.702) (0.755) (0.849) 
SDiff10 2.702* 3.008* 2.473 2.934 3.047 
 
(1.261) (1.524) (1.552) (1.843) (1.879) 
SDiff20 6.691*** 6.899*** 6.402*** 6.838*** 6.875*** 
 
(1.416) (1.517) (1.756) (1.839) (1.958) 
Period -0.247 -0.253 -0.238 -0.241 -0.239 
 
(0.173) (0.166) (0.172) (0.173) (0.161) 
Constant 6.752*** 6.387*** 6.502*** 6.744*** 5.509** 
 
(1.511) (1.673) (1.980) (2.028) (2.036) 
      Observations 190 190 190 190 190 
R-squared 0.206 0.193 0.189 0.195 0.204 
Standard errors clustered at the session reported in parentheses.  This table represents five 
different regressions.  In each, the dependent variable is Supplier profit.  There are the usual 
treatment and period dummies (listed under “Treatment Controls”).  “Retailer has Trait”, 
“Manufacturer has Trait” and “Supplier has Trait” are dummy variables equaling 1 if the 
specified firm has the indicated trait [is risk averse in (1), is selfish in (2), is an altruist in (3), 
is inequity averse in (4) or is surplus maximizing in (5)]. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
Table 8b: Individual Characteristics – Manufacturer Profit 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      Individual Traits Risk Selfish Altruist Fair Efficient 
Retailer has Trait 0.0134 0.539 0.710 -0.280 -0.257 
 
(0.649) (0.923) (0.927) (0.898) (0.851) 
Manufacturer has Trait -1.261* -0.224 -0.0384 0.191 -0.796 
 
(0.657) (0.685) (0.741) (0.786) (0.795) 
Supplier has Trait 1.397* -1.362** 0.160 0.954* -0.0611 
 
(0.722) (0.535) (0.756) (0.522) (1.037) 
Treatment Controls 
     MDiff10 3.650*** 3.226*** 3.476*** 3.267** 3.185** 
 
(0.995) (0.733) (0.955) (1.094) (1.088) 
MDiff20 5.699*** 4.907*** 5.279*** 4.987*** 4.962*** 
 
(0.818) (0.602) (0.678) (0.886) (0.857) 
SDiff10 0.413 1.220* 0.663 0.465 0.506 
 
(0.931) (0.642) (0.955) (0.778) (0.897) 
SDiff20 -1.627*** -0.798*** -1.381*** -1.444*** -1.426*** 
 
(0.284) (0.260) (0.235) (0.356) (0.357) 
Period -0.0583 -0.0834 -0.0967 -0.106 -0.0968 
 
(0.139) (0.135) (0.142) (0.136) (0.130) 
Constant 3.435*** 3.779*** 3.377*** 3.779*** 4.214*** 
 
(0.865) (0.804) (0.861) (0.899) (0.953) 
      Observations 190 190 190 190 190 
R-squared 0.217 0.208 0.188 0.190 0.188 
Standard errors clustered at the session reported in parentheses.  This table represents five 
different regressions.  In each, the dependent variable is Manufacturer profit.  There are the 
usual treatment and period dummies (listed under “Treatment Controls”).  “Retailer has 
Trait”, “Manufacturer has Trait” and “Supplier has Trait” are dummy variables equaling 1 if 
the specified firm has the indicated trait [is risk averse in (1), is selfish in (2), is an altruist in 
(3), is inequity averse in (4) or is surplus maximizing in (5)]. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      
Table 8c: Individual Characteristics – Retailer Profit  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      Individual Traits Risk Selfish Altruist Fair Efficient 
Retailer has Trait -0.161 -0.423 -0.286 1.057 -0.619 
 
(0.803) (0.704) (0.879) (0.856) (0.873) 
Manufacturer has Trait 1.062 0.315 0.295 1.658 -1.012 
 
(0.647) (0.899) (0.818) (1.060) (1.028) 
Supplier has Trait 0.200 0.766 0.503 -0.353 0.381 
 
(0.723) (0.724) (0.651) (0.814) (0.758) 
Treatment Controls 
     MDiff10 -3.189** -3.307** -3.301** -3.562** -3.502** 
 
(1.456) (1.247) (1.321) (1.411) (1.238) 
MDiff20 -4.503*** -4.415*** -4.669*** -4.873*** -4.716*** 
 
(1.071) (0.853) (1.060) (1.453) (1.228) 
SDiff10 -5.587*** -5.998*** -5.516*** -5.973*** -5.688*** 
 
(1.309) (1.172) (1.270) (1.378) (1.264) 
SDiff20 -8.463*** -8.895*** -8.572*** -8.921*** -8.631*** 
 
(0.809) (0.915) (0.796) (0.887) (1.046) 
Period 0.246* 0.251* 0.256* 0.263* 0.259* 
 
(0.124) (0.121) (0.126) (0.137) (0.125) 
Constant 20.48*** 20.92*** 20.73*** 20.67*** 21.45*** 
 
(1.818) (1.534) (1.627) (1.761) (1.787) 
      Observations 190 190 190 190 190 
R-squared 0.347 0.344 0.338 0.367 0.346 
Standard errors clustered at the session reported in parentheses.  This table represents five 
different regressions.  In each, the dependent variable is Retailer profit.  There are the usual 
treatment and period dummies (listed under “Treatment Controls”).  “Retailer has Trait”, 
“Manufacturer has Trait” and “Supplier has Trait” are dummy variables equaling 1 if the 
specified firm has the indicated trait [is risk averse in (1), is selfish in (2), is an altruist in (3), 
is inequity averse in (4) or is surplus maximizing in (5)]. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      
 
Table 9 – Stage 1 Bargaining Offers 
Panel A: Offers with Manufacturer 1 
Treatment 
 
 
 
S1 First 
Offer 
S2 First 
Offer 
M1 First 
Offer 
Avg Accepted 
Offer 
Price 
% of 
ZOPA 
Price 
% of 
ZOPA 
Price 
% of 
ZOPA 
Price 
% of ZOPA 
for M1 
MDiff0  15.34 34% 19.79 1% 13.63 71% 15.64 65% 
Base  15.48 35% 20.86 2% 10.84 81% 13.77 71% 
MDiff20  16.02 37% 20.15 3% 12.09 76% 14.20 69% 
SDiff0  11.39 21% 11.19 21% 7.06 93% 8.15 90% 
SDiff20  20.32 51% 28.30 18% 12.66 74% 17.74 58% 
 
Panel B: Offers with Manufacturer 2 
Treatment 
 
 
 
S1 First 
Offer 
S2 First 
Offer 
M2 First 
Offer 
Avg Accepted 
Offer 
Price 
% of 
ZOPA 
Price 
% of 
ZOPA 
Price 
% of 
ZOPA 
Price 
% of ZOPA 
for M2 
MDiff0  15.63 35% 19.78 2% 13.68 71% 15.42 65% 
Base  14.92 50% 20.63 0% 11.00 70% 12.91 60% 
MDiff20  16.25 56% 20.96 6% 10.88 71% 13.08 60% 
SDiff0  10.84 29% 10.18 29% 8.14 84% 8.61 82% 
SDiff20  19.26 71% 28.21 21% 13.49 58% 15.65 47% 
 
Table 10 – Stage 2 Bargaining Initial Offers 
 
Treatment 
 
 
 
M1 
Total 
Cost 
M2 
Total 
Cost 
M1 First 
Offer 
M2 First 
Offer 
Retailer 
First Offer 
Price 
% of 
ZOPA 
Price 
% of 
ZOPA 
Price 
% of 
ZOPA 
MDiff0  20.66 20.35 26.45 26% 26.73 31% 21.52 88% 
Base  18.98 28.04 28.98 47% 32.83 24% 22.83 82% 
MDiff20  19.22 38.10 32.02 62% 40.07 11% 25.52 70% 
SDiff0  13.16 23.70 26.57 49% 30.46 26% 21.35 72% 
SDiff20  22.74 30.65 31.89 50% 35.94 38% 26.44 81% 
 
Table 11 – Stage 2 Bargaining Average Offers 
 
Treatment 
 
 
 
M1 
Avg 
Offer 
M2 
Avg 
Offer 
Retailer 
Avg 
Offer 
Avg Accepted Offer 
Price 
% of ZOPA 
for R 
MDiff0  25.28 25.67 21.40 23.70 75% 
Base  28.88 32.52 24.01 27.32 61% 
MDiff20  31.11 40.44 25.55 28.41 56% 
SDiff0  24.79 28.69 21.97 23.31 63% 
SDiff20  31.36 34.67 27.31 30.06 58% 
Table 12 – Effect of Initial Offers on Final Price 
VARIABLES 
M1-S Bargaining M2-S Bargaining R-M Bargaining 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   
    
Buyer’s First Offer 0.458*** 0.410*** 0.673*** 0.635*** 0.231*** 0.239*** 
 (0.130) (0.121) (0.0835) (0.0844) (0.0634) (0.0594) 
Seller 1’s First Offer 0.448*** 0.408*** 0.172*** 0.141** 0.249*** 0.257*** 
 (0.103) (0.0977) (0.0544) (0.0547) (0.0758) (0.0751) 
Seller 2’s First Offer 0.0980* -0.0119 0.0681** 0.0193 0.0587 0.0465 
 (0.0464) (0.0383) (0.0241) (0.0349) (0.0544) (0.0609) 
Seller 1’s Total Cost     0.149** 0.0862 
     (0.0624) (0.0723) 
Seller 2’s Total Cost     0.120* 0.156* 
     (0.0622) (0.0900) 
 
      
Treatment Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Constant -0.415 3.344** 1.335 3.325** 1.308*** 1.211*** 
 
(1.023) (1.257) (0.951) (1.295) (0.216) (0.176) 
 
      
Observations 179 179 158 158 164 164 
R-squared 0.668 0.699 0.734 0.748 0.070 0.056 
Standard errors clustered at the session level reported in parentheses.  Dependent variable is the 
agreed upon price. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 13 – Effect of Making the First Offer on Final Price 
VARIABLES 
M1-S Bargaining M2-S Bargaining R-M Bargaining 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   
    
Buyer Made First Offer -0.236 -0.315 0.0517 0.403 -0.702 -0.170 
 
(1.330) (0.824) (0.937) (0.592) (0.680) (0.667) 
 
      
Treatment Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Constant 13.69*** 15.73*** 12.90*** 15.26*** 26.69*** 23.74*** 
 
(1.016) (0.437) (1.060) (0.408) (0.364) (0.665) 
 
      
Observations 236 236 231 231 220 220 
R-squared 0.000 0.352 0.000 0.270 0.004 0.297 
Standard errors clustered at the session level reported in parentheses.  Dependent variable is the 
agreed upon price.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Table 14 – Escalation of Commitment and Bargaining Closure 
VARIABLES 
M1-S Bargaining M2-S Bargaining R-M Bargaining 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   
    
Buyer's Concession 0.146  0.247  0.100  
 
(0.133)  (0.207)  (0.129)  
Seller 1's Concession -0.224  -0.0381  0.413*  
 
(0.417)  (0.0529)  (0.220)  
Seller 2's Concession 0.0302  -0.0838  -0.0218  
 
(0.0597)  (0.0557)  (0.0941)  
Total Concession  0.0315  0.0352  0.144 
 
 (0.0847)  (0.0575)  (0.124) 
Buyer's Initial Claim 
(% ZOPA) 
-0.204* -0.186* -0.175 -0.148 -0.359 -0.296* 
(0.113) (0.0923) (0.127) (0.123) (0.225) (0.175) 
Seller 1's Initial Claim 
(% ZOPA) 
-0.375 -0.371* -0.355 -0.327 -0.415* -0.260 
(0.225) (0.208) (0.233) (0.244) (0.212) (0.160) 
Seller 2's Initial Claim 
(% ZOPA) 
-0.00907 -0.0481 0.221 0.160 0.0537 0.0823 
(0.135) (0.127) (0.157) (0.111) (0.0775) (0.0780) 
Constant 1.262*** 1.241*** 1.197*** 1.176*** 1.308*** 1.211*** 
 
(0.147) (0.123) (0.138) (0.144) (0.216) (0.176) 
 
      
Observations 186 206 171 197 164 164 
R-squared 0.170 0.159 0.076 0.053 0.070 0.056 
Standard errors clustered at the session level reported in parentheses.  Dependent variable is 
an indicator for a bargaining agreement. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
Table 15 – Anti-Concessionary Offers and Prices 
 
Stage 1 
Bargaining 
Stage 2 
Bargaining 
Stage 1 
Bargaining 
Stage 2 
Bargaining 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
    
Sell-side is anti-concessionary 1.477* 1.742** 
  
 
(0.793) (0.786) 
  
Buy-side is anti-concessionary   0.294 -0.297 
 
  (0.455) (0.761) 
Negotiation Involving M2 -0.993***  -0.470  
 
(0.308)  (0.460)  
Treatment Controls YES YES YES YES 
 
    
Observations 323 144 273 100 
R-squared 0.347 0.408 0.324 0.347 
Standard errors clustered at the session level reported in parentheses.  Dependent variable is the agreed 
upon price (conditional on coming to agreement). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Columns (1) and (3) 
report results for the first stage negotiations between the Manufacturers and the Suppliers (we pool 
together negotiations involving both Manufacturers).  Columns (2) and (4) report results for the second 
stage negotiations between the Retailer and the Manufacturers.   “Sell-side is anti-concessionary” is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the sell-side firm that is part of the final agreement made at least one 
anti-concessionary offer.  “Buy-side is anti-concessionary” is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the buy-
side firm made at least one anti-concessionary offer to the sell-side firm that was part of the final 
agreement.  “Negotiation involving M2” is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the agreement is between 
Manufacturer 2 and one of the suppliers.   
  
Figure 7 – Agreement Times by Treatment during Second Stage Bargaining 
 
 
 
  
Table 16 – Effect of Agreement Timing of Buying Firm’s Share 
VARIABLES 
M1-S Bargaining M2-S Bargaining R-M Bargaining 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   
    
Time Accepted by Buyer -0.000366 9.17e-05 -0.000991 -0.000186 -0.000313 -4.37e-05 
 
(0.000503) (0.000363) (0.000793) (0.000505) (0.000371) (0.000373) 
Time Accepted by Seller -0.000172 0.000220 -0.000459 0.000143 -0.000464 -0.000311 
 
(0.000525) (0.000306) (0.000709) (0.000514) (0.000335) (0.000326) 
       
Treatment Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.762*** 0.690*** 0.779*** 0.645*** 0.695*** 0.647*** 
 
(0.0906) (0.0486) (0.107) (0.0811) (0.0580) (0.0674) 
 
      
Observations 195 195 192 192 181 181 
R-squared 0.009 0.440 0.046 0.362 0.016 0.220 
Standard errors clustered at the session level reported in parentheses.  Dependent variable is the fraction of 
the ZOPA allocated to the buyer in the agreement. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  
 Appendix 
Figure A1: Supplier-Manufacturer Negotiation Screen 
 
 
